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Abstract: In this paper I will reflect on sexual assistance, and I will discuss the possibility of shaping sexual 
assistance as a right. The question of whether sexual assistance is a right can have different answers 
depending on the framework we are in. We could fall within a purely legal framework, an ethical 
framework, or a combined framework such as the human rights context. From this point onwards, the 
question of whether sexual assistance is a right shall depend on the answer to the question regarding the 
nature of sexual assistance. Sexual assistance for persons that cannot perform sexual activities on their own 
body can be ethically justified by the theory of needs or by the notion of Instrumental Activities of Daily 
Living. It can also fall within sexual rights or within the right to choose a way of life. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In the context of the rights of persons with disabilities, the reflection on the 
meaning and scope of sexual assistance has gained ground in the last few years. This has 
been due to various factors: firstly, we have acknowledged the need to apply a human 
rights approach when discussing disabilities; secondly, several workshops have been held 
and numerous scholarly works have been performed on this subject; thirdly, certain 
organizations providing these services have appeared. 
 
This is definitely a complex matter, since it addresses issues which are yet to be 
solved from a theoretical standpoint. Furthermore, there are opposing views in this regard, 
as well as many stereotypes, particularly affecting persons with disabilities.  
                                                     
1 Instituto de Derechos Humanos Bartolomé de las Casas, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Spain 
(rafael.asis@uc3m.es). 
The Spanish version of this work was published in Revista Española de Discapacidad, vol. 5, n. 2, 2017 
(https://www.cedd.net/redis/index.php/redis/article/view/368). The English translation has been made by 
Frutos Miranda Traductores.  
This work has been performed within the framework of projects “Madrid sin Barreras: discapacidad e 
inclusión social” (S2015/HUM-3330) and “Diseño, accesibilidad y ajustes. El eje de los derechos de las 
personas con discapacidad” (DER2016-75164-P). I shared a first draft of this paper in the Working 
Sessions on Functional Diversity and Sexual Assistance (Jornadas sobre Diversidad Funcional y 
Asistencia Sexual), hosted by Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, in May 2017. I would like to thank the 
attendants for their helpful remarks. I would also like to thank Pablo A. Cantero Garlito for his comments 
on the Instrumental Activities of Daily Living. 
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Self-evidently, the reflection on sexual activity and sexual rights in the context of 
disability has been conditioned by certain aspects that must be tackled from the outset. In 
a recent work, I mentioned a three-step approach to the rights of persons with disabilities. 
One of these steps was normalcy.  
 
Normalcy entails fighting against the prevailing stereotypes in this domain, which 
often depart from the consideration of disabled persons as asexual beings or otherwise 
sexually dependent. Some other times, the said stereotypes are based on the premise that 
disabled people shall only interact with other persons with disabilities, or on the idea that 
persons with intellectual disabilities “show an excessive sex drive or fail to adequately 
control their sexual behavior.”2  
 
In this paper I will reflect on sexual assistance, and I will discuss the possibility 
of shaping sexual assistance as a right. I will do this within the framework of the human 
rights theory,3 whilst adopting (as it could not be otherwise) a human rights based 
approach to disability.4  
 
I. THE TRUE MEANING OF THE QUESTION 
 
The question of whether sexual assistance is a right can have different answers 
depending on the framework we are in. We could fall within a purely legal framework, 
an ethical framework, or a combined framework such as the human rights context.  
 
If we adopt a legal standpoint, we must clarify what must be deemed as a right 
and when we are facing a right. There is no single answer for these two issues, since they 
depend on schools of thought and scholarly doctrines. 
 
Indeed, throughout the history of Law there have been very different responses to 
the question of what must be considered to be a right. In this regard, there has been a 
clash between two main theories advocated by two scholars of great renown, i.e. Ihering’s 
theory of interest and Savigny’s voluntary submission theory. However, there have also 
been other views, and some of them have even reject the actual existence of rights. 
 
For the purposes of this work, we could think of rights in terms of willingness or 
choice, or in terms of interest (whether individual or objective). Nevertheless, we could 
also understand a right as a given situation. This is actually the point of a famous German 
legal scholar when discussing individual rights: W.N. Hohfeld.  
 
Hohfeld studied the use of the term “right” in the legal domain and pointed to four 
possible meanings.5 According to this scholar, the notion of right was used as a claim, as 
                                                     
2 See Arnau Ripollés, S., “La asistencia sexual a debate,” in Dilemata, no. 15, 2014, p. 9. 
3 See Barranco, M.C., Condición humana y derechos humanos: algunas claves filosóficas para un modelo 
de derechos humanos, Dykinson, Madrid, 2016. 
4 See Palacios, A., El modelo social de la discapacidad, Colección CERMI, Madrid, 2008, p. 103 et seq. 
5 See Hohfeld, W.N., Conceptos jurídicos fundamentales, translated by G. R. Carrió, Centro Editor de 
América Latina S.A., Buenos Aires, 1968. 
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a freedom, as a prerogative or as room for immunity. In order to fully understand its 
meaning, Hohfeld established a list of opposite situations (the opposite of holding a right 
for an individual) as well as a list of complementary situations (the situation of the other 
person when his or her counterpart actually holds a right). 
 
Accordingly, the opposite of a claim is the absence of a right, and a duty 
complements a right; the opposite of freedom is a duty imposed on the individual, 
whereas the absence of a right complements freedom; the opposite of a prerogative is the 
lack of power or competence, whereas the complementary situation to a prerogative is 
subjection; finally, the opposite of immunity is subjection, whereas the lack of power or 
competence complements immunity. 
 
Regarding the foregoing, it is worth noting that there is always some sort of 
willingness or interest underlying a right, which can appear as a claim, a freedom, a given 
prerogative or certain room for immunity, and which entails that a given individual is in 
a situation that can be identified in obligational terms.  
 
Nevertheless, the previous conclusion does not suffice, provided that the existence 
of a right also requires legal acknowledgment, i.e. the situation underlying a right must 
be legally acknowledged; additionally, the interest or willingness must also have some 
sort of legal acknowledgment. 
 
Furthermore, we must wonder how this legal acknowledgment is attained, since 
it is mainly achieved through a given rule where the right is enshrined or which empowers 
or enables individuals to establish legal relationships based on which rights and 
obligations are shaped. In both cases, the existence of the rule or the validity of the legal 
relationship will be determined by its conformity with the remaining rules, and ultimately 
by the compliance with the legal criteria represented by human rights in constitutional 
systems. 
 
From this point onwards, the question of whether sexual assistance is a right shall 
depend on the answer to the question regarding the nature of sexual assistance. 
 
If we ask ourselves the question from an ethical standpoint we would be thinking 
of sexual assistance as a moral right.6 But, what is a moral right and when are we actually 
confronted with a moral right?  
 
As it happened in the legal domain, there is no single answer to this question. 
Moral rights have been construed as powers, prerogatives, freedoms, claims, interests, 
expressions of willingness, immunities, capacities, possibilities, needs... As can be seen, 
at this point there is little difference between the legal and ethical construction. 
 
                                                     
6 The notion of moral rights is very controversial in Philosophy of Law. See, in this regard, Nino, C.S., 
“Sobre los derechos morales,” in Doxa, no.7, 1990, p. 311 et seq. 
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Moreover, the most important aspect of moral rights’ construction is the ethical 
acknowledgment of the relevant claim, as it happened in the legal domain. Such 
acknowledgment appears as grounds, i.e. a moral right is held when there are moral 
grounds that justify the said moral right. Along these lines, the existence of a moral right 
shall be determined by how solid these justifying grounds are.  
 
From this point, the question of whether sexual assistance is a moral right shall 
depend on how we define sexual assistance. 
 
Finally, we can ask ourselves this question from a human rights perspective: is 
sexual assistance a human right? As in the two previous cases, in order to answer this 
question we must know what a human right is. Similarly, there is no single answer to this 
question. However, it is worth noting that, as opposed to the two previous cases, there is 
a list of human rights enshrined in international declarations as well as in domestic 
constitutions. Thus, in order to adequately answer the question, we could look for the 
acknowledgment of sexual assistance as a human right in any of these texts. 
 
If we examine human rights laid down in declarations, conventions and 
constitutions, we will not find a right to sexual assistance. Conversely, we may be able to 
argue about its existence based on other rights or on core elements of the human rights 
discourse. However, this path forces us to question ourselves about the actual essence of 
human rights. 
 
Although there are different approaches to human rights,7 some distinct features 
can be found in almost any approach thereto, which are consistent with the legal and 
ethical notions of rights.8 Therefore, human rights amount to requirements, needs, claims, 
etc. that can appear in any of the situations described by Hohfeld, generally supported by 
legal provisions as well as by ethical reasons for the enforcement thereof. Human rights 
are distinct because there is always going to be another side of the coin: a duty is always 
going to be complemented, among others, by the Government (either as a guarantor of 
rights or as a promoter thereof), and the ethical arguments that justify such rights is tied 
to the development of a dignified human life. 
 
Yet again, it is essential to clarify the meaning of sexual assistance in order to 
verify if it is connected with a dignified human life. 
 
Although we still have to clarify the meaning of sexual assistance, the question of 
whether it amounts to a right depends, from a legal perspective, on the existence of a valid 
legal provision. From an ethical standpoint, it depends on the existence of moral grounds, 
and from a human rights perspective it depends on a legal provision, but particularly on 
the existence of an obligation incumbent upon the Government as well as on grounds tied 
to a dignified human life. 
 
                                                     
7 See Rodríguez Toubes, J., La razón de los derechos, Tecnos, Madrid, 1995, p. 20 et seq. 
8 See De Asís, R., Sobre el concepto y el fundamento de los derechos: una aproximación dualista, 
Dykinson, 2001, p. 6 et seq. 
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II. WHAT IS SEXUAL ASSISTANCE? 
 
As it happened with the notion of right, there is no single perspective on sexual 
assistance. The primary meaning of sexual assistance relates to the help or support 
provided for the performance of sexual activities. In this connection, sexual assistance 
would involve a third party.9 This aspect constrains and ultimately defines the approach 
to sexual activity. Accordingly, we can mainly differentiate between three kinds of sexual 
activity. First, the activity performed by oneself; second, sexual intercourse between two 
people; finally, a sexual relationship between two people with no physical contact.  
 
In the context of disability, the term “assistance” is often referred to personal 
assistance, which involves the help provided by one person to another so the latter can 
carry out different activities or even the first may actually perform such activities for the 
latter.  
 
As is well known, the issue of sexual assistance falls within the rights of persons 
with disabilities discourse. Indeed, it is a core element of what in other papers I have 
designated as “accessibility axis,” made up of universal design (a general principle that 
gives rise to specific obligations), accessibility measures (general measures appearing 
when universal design is not fulfilled in a justified manner), and reasonable 
accommodation (individual measures applicable when accessibility requirements are not 
met in a justified manner through universal design or accessibility measures).  
 
Article 9 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities addresses 
universal accessibility in the following terms: “To enable persons with disabilities to live 
independently and participate fully in all aspects of life, States Parties shall take 
appropriate measures to ensure to persons with disabilities access, on an equal basis with 
others, to the physical environment, to transportation, to information and 
communications, including information and communications technologies and systems, 
and to other facilities and services open or provided to the public, both in urban and in 
rural areas.” 
 
Hence, one could speak of a narrow and a broad meaning of accessibility. The 
narrow meaning of accessibility applicable to “products, environments, programmes and 
services,” entails “persons with disabilities access, on an equal basis with others, to the 
physical environment, to transportation, to information and communications, including 
information and communications technologies and systems, and to other facilities and 
services open or provided to the public, both in urban and in rural areas.” Accessibility in 
a broader sense brings along the access of persons with disabilities to all legal interests 
and rights, and it revolves around an independent living and their participation as equal 
                                                     
9 This work will focus on sexual assistance provided by a person. However, such assistance could even be 
provided by machines. Some scholars consider that this would almost settle the debate, which leads to 
consider that one of the main issues regarding sexual assistance has to do with the assistant’s rights and 
overall situation. Furthermore, the possibility of using machines in this kind of activity can also pose certain 
problems. I have tackled this matter in Una mirada a la robótica desde los derechos humanos, Dykinson, 
Madrid, 2015. 
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members of society. It is closely connected with the notion of ability or capacity, and it 
underscores its dimension as a possibility or, better said, as a right to hold rights. 
 
Support and assistance are key tools within the rights of persons with disabilities 
discourse. Although they have different meanings and implications, support is often 
connected with the exercise of rights, and assistance is usually tied to an independent 
living as well as to instrumental activities of daily living. 
 
Therefore, we can highlight two broad meanings of support. On the one hand, a 
meaning related to the exercise of rights; in this vein, we can refer to educational support 
(Article 73 et seq. of Organic Act 2/2006, of 3 May, on Education -Ley Orgánica 2/2006, 
de 3 de mayo, de Educación-) or to supported employment (Article 2(1) of Royal Decree 
870/2007 of 2 July -Real Decreto 870/2007 de 2 de julio-). On the other hand, support 
may be connected with the exercise of abilities or capacities, and particularly with 
decision-making (Article 12 CRPD). 
 
Likewise, we can address two broad meanings of assistance. First, the one 
projected onto the exercise of rights in connection with independent living, thus tied to 
the first meaning of support. Second, the meaning that connects assistance with what has 
traditionally been designated as instrumental (or basic) activities of daily living (Article 
2 of Act 39/2006 on the promotion of personal autonomy and care of dependent persons 
-Ley 39/2006 de promoción de la autonomía personal y atención a las personas en 
situación de dependencia-). 
 
Accordingly, support and assistance can be jointly examined, with three main 
projections attached thereto: a) exercise of rights; b) decision-making; and, c) 
instrumental (or basic) activities of daily living. 
 
These three projections or meanings of support and assistance can be found in the 
“accessibility axis” and in its three core elements. Therefore, they can be implemented as 
universal design (general measures for all enabling everyone), accessibility measures 
(general measures enabling persons with disabilities) or as accommodation (individual 
measures).  
 
For instance, considering the right to access to justice, universal design requires 
buildings to be accessible; accessibility measures require solving -on a universal basis- a 
justified lack of accessibility (for instance, because the building is old); and reasonable 
accommodation requires specifically remedying a justified lack of accessibility (for 
instance, to condition a given room). We can apply this outline to support. Such support 
measures can be part of universal design or they may belong to accessibility measures 
(existence of specialized personnel to assist persons with intellectual disabilities in court), 
but they can also fall within reasonable accommodation (personal assistant or support 
person for decision-making).  
 
Along these lines, both support and assistance can be part of the “accessibility 
axis,” and therefore they can be involved in the various legal constructs provided in other 
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works on accessibility. They can belong to the core content of rights, and the lack thereof 
can thus entail a violation of the relevant right. However, they can also operate as actual 
rights. Thus, in Sobre discapacidad y derechos (Dykinson, Madrid 2013), I have 
considered the possibility of shaping a right to decision-making support, or a right to 
assistance for the instrumental activities of daily living. 
 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, as I have stated in previous works, the universal 
“accessibility axis” can be limited by three kinds of circumstances, i.e. the boundaries of 
necessity, of possibility and reasonableness. The boundaries of necessity relate to the kind 
of legal interests, products, services or rights on which accessibility can be projected; the 
boundaries of possibility are mainly related to the situation of scientific knowledge and 
human diversity; the boundaries of reasonableness are tied to the lack of justification for 
accessibility, since it affects other rights and legal interests or since it entails an 
unreasonable cost.  
 
This general construct regarding the boundaries of the “accessibility axis” 
acquires certain distinct connotations when applied to support and assistance. This is 
mainly due to two reasons. First, because sometimes in these situations a third party’s 
rights (those of the person providing the assistance or support) can be at stake. Second, 
because some other times the point is to support a person’s will, and at this point we could 
put forward certain justified requirements in favor of the assistant or the person 
supporting himself/herself. 
 
Indeed, despite our emphasis on integrating the notions of support and assistance 
within the individual exercise of a right, as well as within an extension of the person itself, 
the truth is that whenever such support and assistance are provided by a person, such 
person’s rights are actually at stake. Along these lines, we must weigh the various legal 
interests involved. Moreover, when this support or assistance is tied to the individual’s 
decision-making, particularly when touching on core individual aspects, some might 
argue in favor of protecting the person itself. Self-evidently, in both cases this construct 
becomes even more complex. 
 
In the context of personal assistance we can find activities such as personal 
hygiene, activities related to the house, accompanying activities or driving, but sexual 
activities are not included therein.10 
                                                     
10 According to Soledad Arnau, personal assistance is an instrumental need, whereas sexual assistance is a 
secondary need. In her view, “Personal Assistance somehow contributes to enhance one’s sexuality, at least 
in an indirect manner. In other words, certain persons with functional diversities would be unable to access 
their current resources (going out, entering into clubs, sex-shops, preparing for sexual relations...) without 
their Personal Assistants.” She claims that sexual assistance is an optional or enabling resource, “a direct 
resource allowing a person with functional diversities to live his or her sexuality, but it shall never be 
construed as the only possible alternative.” Arnau Ripollés, Mª. S., “Asistencia Sexual. Otro medio, no un 
fin, para alcanzar el Derecho Humano a una Vida Independiente en materia de Sexualidad,” Universidad 
Abierta Iberoamericana Manuel Lobato (UAI Manuel Lobato-IPADEVI), Madrid 2013. Available online 
at: http:// www.slideshare.net/solearnau/asistencia-sexual-sept-2013. 
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In this connection, within the context of disability, sexual assistance is a special 
form of assistance encompassing the three dimensions of sexual activity mentioned above 
along with the preparation to sexual relationships. 
 
It is central to lay down certain criteria that may allow us to individualize sexual 
assistance in the disability domain, thereby drawing a distinction between sexual 
assistance and other sex-related services. Out of the four activities mentioned above, there 
are two activities that acquire their own dimension, and which can be differentiated from 
other sex services that go beyond disability. They both require a distinct justification 
when the person willing to perform the relevant activity is materially unable to do so, i.e.: 
preparation for sex and sexual activity performed on oneself. 
 
However, the first one can be considered to be personal assistance, whereas the 
latter would be sexual assistance in a strict sense. According to Antonio Centeno, “sexual 
assistance for persons with functional diversities is a common ground for personal sexual 
assistance (which fulfils the right to access one’s own body) and sex-related services 
(wherein sexual pleasure is obtained in exchange for money).”11 This scholar contends 
that sexual assistance is connected with self-sexuality. Nevertheless, according to him, 
when sexual assistance involves a sexual relationship we are actually confronted with 
prostitution. 
 
III. SEXUAL ASSISTANCE AS A RIGHT 
 
Once we have determined the meaning of sexual assistance, we can re-examine 
the possibility of shaping sexual assistance as an individual right. 
 
As stated above, one path entailed considering sexual assistance as the result of a 
legal relationship, according to which an individual would be a right holder and his/her 
counterparty would be subject to an obligation. As is well-known, Article 1089 of the 
Spanish Civil Code sets out that obligations arise from legal provisions, from legal 
agreements or contracts, and from quasi-contracts. Accordingly, this would equal to 
consider sexual assistance as a service to be provided.  
 
In order to further examine this path the validity requirement must be met, i.e. we 
must take into account Article 1255 of the Spanish Civil Code: “The contracting parties 
may establish any covenants, clauses and conditions deemed convenient, provided that 
they are not contrary to the law, to morality or to public order.” 
 
Is sexual assistance contrary to the Spanish legal system? As is well known, 
Spanish law is somewhat cautious when dealing with sexual work. One could assert that 
there is no explicit prohibition of a free provision of sex-related services.12 On that basis, 
personal assistance would not be forbidden.  
                                                     
11 Centeno, A., “Asistencia sexual para personas con diversidad funcional,” 2014, Available online at: 
http://derechoshumanosya.org/asistencia-sexual-para-personas-con-diversidad-funcional/  
12 In Spain, this conclusion is often supported by the famous case of the Senior Judge Gloria Poyatos. She 
registered with the Spanish IRS and she registered in the Social Security System as a prostitute. Article 187 
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As has been highlighted throughout this work, considering sex services to be legal 
depends on whether such services are freely provided, and this is the most troublesome 
issue in this regard, in addition to other considerations such as the exploitation of women 
or the commodification of persons. However, these claims become less solid having 
regard to the shaping of personal assistance performed herein, which with such meaning 
and scope can become the subject of an agreement providing certain rights and 
obligations. 
 
If, according to our interpretation, sexual assistance can be the subject of a service 
provision agreement, why would it be interesting to shape it as a moral right or a human 
right? In my view, there are two reasons for this. The first one has to do with its strength 
and cost; considering sexual assistance as a right with solid ethical foundations, or even 
as a human right, provides good reasons to get the Government involved in the fulfilment 
thereof. The second reason has to do with displaying sexual assistance as a demand in 
line with the struggle against discrimination and the protection of the rights of persons 
with disabilities. 
 
As has been examined above, we need legal grounds (mainly a legal provision in 
the broader sense), as well as an ethical justification, to deem sexual assistance as a right. 
 
The legal grounds can arise from the connection between sexual activity and 
sexual rights, or rather from the ties between sexual activity and other human rights. 
 
In the context of human rights, sexual rights were defined for the first time in the 
Fourth World Conference on Women: “The human rights of women include their right to 
have control over and decide freely and responsibly on matters related to their sexuality, 
including sexual and reproductive health, free of coercion, discrimination and violence. 
Equal relationships between women and men in matters of sexual relations and 
reproduction, including full respect for the integrity of the person, require mutual respect, 
consent and shared responsibility for sexual behavior and its consequences.”13 
 
We shall construe the notion of sexual rights as a set of claims mainly aimed at 
ensuring the autonomous and responsible control over all issues regarding sexuality. 
Conversely, the purpose of reproductive rights is to protect any decisions concerning 
women’s reproductive behavior. 
 
These rights are grounded on human rights.14 In this regard, they are based on the 
values that govern the human rights discourse (dignity, freedom and equality). In 
                                                     
of the Spanish Criminal Code proscribes forced prostitution, which under Article 188 is a more serious 
crime if it involves children or persons with disabilities in need of special protection. Furthermore, the Act 
on Public Safety (Ley de Seguridad Ciudadana) provides for penalties on prostitution when carried out in 
certain public areas. In addition, several local rules and regulations address prostitution. 
13 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, Fourth World Conference on Women, 15 September 1995, 
A/CONF.177/20 and A/CONF.177/20/Add.1. 
14 Declaration of Sexual Rights of the World Association for Sexual Health, available at 
http://www.diamundialsaludsexual.org/declaracion-de-los-derechos-sexuales, accessed on 29 December 
2016. 
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addition, they are also closely tied to numerous legal interests underlying the human rights 
discourse (health, for instance).  
 
In any event, the meaning and scope of these rights remain unclear. There are 
different dimensions within sexual rights. Accordingly, within sexual rights we can talk 
about sexual freedom (i.e. free decision-making regarding sexuality), privacy, non-
discrimination, education, information and sexual health. Furthermore, reproductive 
rights comprise reproductive freedom (free decision-making concerning a woman’s 
reproductive behavior) and reproductive health. Thus, they are rights that not only require 
protection, but they must also be provided and enforced. 
 
Sexual rights have been fostered within the framework of women’s rights claims 
and their struggle for non-discrimination.15 
 
The inclusion of disabilities in the human rights discourse requires extending 
sexual and reproductive rights to persons with disabilities. This is certainly not a new 
issue. In 1981 the Charter of Sexual Rights in favor of Persons with Disabilities was 
adopted in Havana, following the efforts of the Cuban grassroots movement (movimiento 
asociativo cubano). Such Charter enshrined the following rights: (i) the right to sexual 
expression; (ii) the right to privacy; (iii) the right to information; (iv) the right to access 
the necessary services, such as contraception advice, medical attention and genetic and 
sexuality advice; (v) the right to choose the most suitable marital status for persons with 
disabilities; (vi) the right to offspring; (vii) the right to make decisions affecting one’s 
own life; (viii) the right to try to fulfil the individual’s full potential. 
 
Nevertheless, this issue has not been tackled from an individual rights approach. 
This is due to the prevailing social view of disability and to the problems attached to 
dealing with sex-related issues. 
 
We also face these constraints if we advocate for the inclusion of sexual activities 
within the content of other rights, such as freedom or health, or within other legal 
interests. Although I will go back to this point, it is worth noting that this inclusion is not 
unanimously accepted. Additionally, from a legal perspective, the acknowledgment of 
implicit rights (often designated as implied or underlying rights) is troublesome in certain 
contexts. 
 
As is well known, the notion of implicit rights refers both to rights which have not 
been expressly enshrined in a given Constitution and, as a legal principle, to those rights 
the content of which can be inferred from the actually listed rights.16 The Spanish 
Constitution fails to address implicit rights (as opposed to the Argentinian Constitution, 
which mentions implicit rights in Article 33). However, we can often find lines of 
                                                     
15See, for instance, Londoño, M.L., Derechos sexuales y reproductivos, ISEDER, Colombia, 1996. 
16 On this matter, see Gros Espiell, H., “Los derechos humanos no enunciados o no enumerados en el 
Constitucionalismo Americano y en el artículo 29.C de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos 
Humanos,” in Anuario Iberoamericano de Justicia Constitucional, 4, 2000, p. 146. 
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reasoning arguing that certain rights and claims can be inferred from the constitutional 
framework even if they are not expressly contained in the constitutional provisions.17  
 
In any event, the success of the abovementioned lines of reasoning is closely tied 
to sound ethical arguments. In this regard, when it comes to justifying sexual activities 
from an ethical standpoint, there are two possible paths to be taken: a line of reasoning 
based on needs, or rather the construction sexual activities as an essential legal interest or 
activity. 
 
In the contemporary rights discourse, basic needs are often put forward as 
justifying grounds.18 This also happens in the majority of moral philosophy scholarly 
works, were the fulfilment of basic needs is an ethical imperative.19 Nevertheless, it is 
worth noting that not every right is aimed at fulfilling a basic need, and thus considering 
sexual activities as a basic need would not necessarily solve the problem. However, it 
would further advance the construction of sexual assistance as a right. 
 
The underlying issue in the basic needs discourse is the lack of consensus on the 
meaning of such basic needs as well as regarding the difference between them and 
satisfiers, wishes or preferences.20 Neither there is consensus on whether sexual activities 
can be deemed as a need. For those who understand basic needs as those which in lack 
thereof will lead to death, sexual activity is not a basic need, although it is included in 
certain classifications of needs.21  
 
Conversely, within the occupational therapy discourse, with significant 
implications in the personal assistance domain, the notion of “Instrumental Activities of 
Daily Living” is often applied to those activities oriented towards taking care of one’s 
own body as well as to any essential activity required for an effective participation in 
society.22 In the most commonly used list of these activities, that of the American 
Occupational Therapy Association, sexual activity is acknowledged as an Instrumental 
Activity of Daily Living.23  
                                                     
17 A common example in Spain is Constitutional Court Ruling no. 31/1981 (Sentencia 31/1981 del Tribunal 
Constitucional), which infers the in dubio pro reo principle from the presumption of innocence laid down 
in Article 24 of the Spanish Constitution. This inference has been challenged by scholars. 
18 See Añón Roig, M.J., Necesidades y derechos: un ensayo de fundamentación, Centro de Estudios 
Constitucionales, Madrid, 1994.  
19 See Ribotta, S., “Necesidades, igualdad y justicia. Construyendo una propuesta igualitaria de necesidades 
básicas,” in Derechos y Libertades, no. 24, 2011, p. 259 et seq. 
20 See Ribotta, S., “Necesidades y derechos: un debate no zanjado sobre fundamentación de derechos,” in 
Jurídicas, 5 (1), Universidad de Caldas, 2008, p. 29 et seq. 
21 See Braybrooke, D., Meeting Needs, Princeton University Press, Princeton-New Jersey, 1987, p. 60 et 
seq. 
22 See Rogers, J. C. and Holm, M. B., “Assessment of self-care,” in Bonder, B.R. and Wagner, M.B. (eds.), 
Functional performance in older adults, F.A. Davis, Philadelphia 2009, p. 181–202; see also, Christiansen, 
C. H. and Hammecker, C. L., “Self care,” in Bonder, B.R. and Wagner, M.B. (eds.), Functional 
performance in older adults, cit., p. 155–175.  
23 American Occupational Therapy Association. “Occupational therapy practice framework: Domain and 
process” (3rd ed.), American Journal of Occupational Therapy, 68, 2014. Available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5014/ajot.2014.682006 
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Therefore, sexual assistance for persons that cannot perform sexual activities on 
their own body can be ethically justified by the theory of needs or by the notion of 
Instrumental Activities of Daily Living.24 It can also fall within sexual rights or within 
the right to choose a way of life (given the connection between the Instrumental Activities 
of Daily Living and this right).25 
 
Accordingly, we could refer to sexual assistance as a right. Indeed, based on how 
we have construed the notions of support and assistance, we could even deem sexual 
assistance as a core element of rights (such as the right to sexual freedom or the right to 
choose a way of life). 
 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, there are significant limits to the construction of 
sexual assistance as a right and as an ethically relevant legal interest. These boundaries 
have to do with the other side of the coin, i.e. the obligation attached to the right and thus 
with the Government’s role and the rights of the person providing the relevant assistance. 
 
Could it be asserted that the Government has to help me in this domain provided 
that I am entitled (or, put differently, I hold the right) to sexual assistance? When I 
addressed the “accessibility axis” I pointed out that one of the limits came hand in hand 
with reasonableness, and that the latter often became an economic issue. If we place 
sexual assistance within the human rights domain, this claim is pushed right into the 
background. As I have stated in other works: “Limiting a right based on its excessive cost 
is simply unacceptable in the human rights discourse, unless there is evidence that such 
cost is causing insurmountable damage to other rights. At this point, the key is not the 
cost but the impact on the other right. Economics must be at the service of rights and not 
the other way around.”26 Hence, “there is no room for the cost as an argument independent 
from the enjoyment of rights. In order for it to be an admissible argument, the cost must 
be tied to the actual rights (i.e. it must limit other individuals’ rights). Additionally, it will 
have to assess the cost attached to the non-fulfilment of the relevant legal interest in terms 
of lack of integration or segregation.”27  
 
Hence, it could be argued that the Government must be required to provide this 
right, although this provision would have to be weighed against the impact on other 
fundamental rights and legal interests (as it often happens in the rights discourse). 
 
The same applies to the other side of the coin, i.e. the obligation attached to this 
possible right: the obligation incumbent upon the assistant. In this connection, this right’s 
construction requires to clearly determine the scope of the assistance and the assistant’s 
                                                     
 
 
24 In support of this argument we could find the possibility of banning any sexual activity performed on 
one’s own body. Regardless of any ethical and religious grounds (or even claims disguised as medical 
criteria) advocating for this possibility, it does not look like the Law would be able to enforce it.  
25 See de Asís, R., Sobre discapacidad y derechos, Dykinson, Madrid, 2013, p. 91 et seq. 
26 De Asís, R., “El eje de la accesibilidad y sus límites,” in Anales de Derecho y Discapacidad, no. 1, 2016, 
p. 65. 
27 De Asís, R., Sobre discapacidad y derechos, cit., p.124. 
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rights and obligations. This issue cannot be tackled in this paper, but it is rather complex. 
We should not forget that the rights and obligations attached to personal assistance are 
still to be defined in legal provisions. 
 
In this paper I can neither focus on the implications of this possible right regarding 
persons with intellectual and psychosocial disabilities. In these cases there is a twofold 
support or assistance. On the one hand, sexual assistance as has been examined herein; 
on the other, the assistance related to the decision of performing, or not, a sexual activity. 
The latter entails providing support to decision-making, as it happens in other situations.28 
However, such support cannot be provided by the sexual assistant insofar as there is some 
sort of economic compensation for this service. 
 
IV. SOME CONCLUSIONS 
 
Sexual assistance in the field of disability is a type of special assistance that 
incorporates four dimensions: the activity of a person in his own body, the activity that 
consists of a physical sexual relationship between two people, the activity that consists of 
a relationship sex between two people No physical contact and preparation for sexual 
activity. 
 
Sexual assistance can be constructed as the object of a service. However, there are 
two arguments that favor its consideration as a right. The first has to do with its strength 
and its cost. The consideration of sexual assistance as a right with a strong ethical 
justification or as a human right, provides reasons to implicate the State in its satisfaction. 
The second one has to do with presenting it as a demand consistent with the movement 
that fights against discrimination and for the rights of people with disabilities. 
 
The consideration of sexual assistance as a right depends, in a legal sense, on the 
existence of a valid legal norm; in its ethical sense, the existence of a moral reason; in a 
sense of the human right of a norm, but above all, of the existence of an obligation of the 
State and of a reason linked to the dignified human life. 
 
The legal reason may come from the connection between sexual activity and 
sexual rights or from the connection between sexual activity and other human rights. But 
we also need a convincing ethical argument. To justify sexual activity as an ethical reason, 
we can follow two paths: that of needs or that of understanding it as a fundamental good 
or activity. 
 
But sexual assistance understood in this way has limitations in its own 
construction, which have to do with the correlative situation of obligation and, therefore, 
with the role of the State and with the rights of the person performing the assistance. In 
relation to the role of the State, there are arguments to defend a performance benefit that 
                                                     
28 See Cuenca, P., “El sistema de apoyo en la toma de decisiones desde la Convención Internacional sobre 
los Derechos de las Personas con Discapacidad: principios generales, aspectos centrales e implementación 
en la legislación española,” in REDUR 10, December 2012, p. 61 et seq. See also, Bariffi, F.J., El régimen 
jurídico internacional de la capacidad jurídica de las personas con discapacidad, Cinca, Madrid 2014. 
RAFAEL DE ASÍS ROIG 
The Age of Human Rights Journal, 12 (June 2019) pp. 133-147  ISSN: 2340-9592  DOI: 10.17561/tahrj.n12.7   146 
 
must be weighed against its effect on other rights and fundamental goods (as is usual in 
the discourse of rights). On the other hand, the construction of this right requires clearly 
establishing the scope of assistance and the rights and obligations of the assistant. 
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